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Tables and figures Abstract
We use a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with stochastic
volatility for GDP deﬂator inﬂation, real GDP growth, a 3-month nominal rate,
and the rate of growth of M4 to investigate the underlying causes of the Great
Moderation in the United Kingdom.
Our evidence points towards a dominant role played by shocks in fostering
t h em o r es t a b l em a c r o e c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n to ft h el a s tt w od e c a d e s .R e s u l t s
from counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that (1) the Great Inﬂation
was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a
lesser extent–especially in 1973 and 1979–to supply shocks; (2) imposing the
1970s’ monetary rule over the entire sample period would have made almost
no diﬀerence in terms of inﬂation and output growth outcomes; and (3) me-
chanically ‘bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in time’ would only
have had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode, at the cost of lower
output growth.
These results are quite striking in the light of the more traditional, narra-
tive approach, which suggests that the monetary policy regime is an important
factor in explaining the Great Moderation in the United Kingdom. We discuss
one interpretation which could explain both sets of results, based on the ‘inde-
terminacy hypothesis’ advocated, for the United States, by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
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Non Technical Summary
As we documented in previous research–see Benati (2004) and especially Benati
(2006)–under inﬂation targeting the United Kingdom has enjoyed, so far, the most
stable macroeconomic environment in its recorded history, with the volatilities of the
business-cycle components of real GDP, national accounts aggregates, and inﬂation
measures having been, post-October 1992, systematically lower than for any of the
previous monetary regimes/historical periods since the metallic standards era.
Where does such a remarkable and historically unprecedented stability come from?
Providing an answer to this question is of obvious, crucial importance. If the bulk of
the stability of the post-1992 era were attributable to the impact of the new monetary
framework, we then might be reasonably conﬁdent that macroeconomic instability
was a memory of the past–with the right monetary policy in place, the 1970s could
never return. If, on the other hand, the current stable macroeconomic environment
found its origin in the fact that, in recent years, the U.K. economy has been spared
the large shocks of previous decades, having the best possible monetary framework
in place would not necessarily shield the United Kingdom from a reappearance of
macroeconomic turbulence.
In this paper we use a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with
stochastic volatility to shed some light on the deep underlying causes of the Great
Moderation in the United Kingdom. Our main objective is to evaluate the com-
parative likelihood of two main rival explanations/stories which have been advanced
in the context of the debate on the stabilization of the U.S. economy under Alan
Greenspan’s tenure–the ‘good luck’ versus ‘good policy’ debate. Our main results
may be summarised as follows.
The evolution of the coeﬃcients of the structural monetary rule in the VAR
is broadly in line with the narrative evidence, with, e.g., a comparatively weaker
long-run response to inﬂation before 1979-1980, a marked increase under Margaret
Thatcher, and a further increase under inﬂation targeting. Interestingly, the period
during which the United Kingdom was a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of
the European Monetary System was characterised by signiﬁcant temporary decreases
in the long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation, output growth, and the rate of growth of M4,
thus dramatically highlighting how during that period U.K. monetary policy–being
‘done in Frankfurt’–was virtually disconnected from domestic economic conditions.
When seen under this perspective, the crisis of ‘Black Wednesday’ appears, in a sense,
all but inevitable.
Exactly in line with the U.S. literature, however–see especially Primiceri (2005),
Sims and Zha (2006), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006), and Benati and Mumtaz
(2007)–our evidence points towards a dominant role played by shocks in fostering
the more stable macroeconomic environment of the most recent period. Results from
counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that
( 1 )t h eG r e a tI n ﬂation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy6
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shocks, and to a lesser extent–especially in 1973 and 1979–to supply shocks.
(2) Imposing the 1970s’ monetary rule over the entire sample period would have
made almost no diﬀerence in terms of inﬂation and output growth outcomes.
(3) Alternatively, mechanically ‘bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in
time’ would only have had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode.
Although in line with the literature on the U.S., these results are quite striking,
in particular in the light of the more traditional, narrative approach which suggests
that the monetary policy regime has been an important factor in explaining the Great
Moderation in the United Kingdom. One interpretation that could reconcile the two
sets of results is based on the ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ advocated, for the United
States, by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). In
a nutshell, the idea is that monetary policy was not suﬃciently stabilising around
t h et i m eo ft h eG r e a tI n ﬂation, and therefore allowed self-fulﬁlling sunspot shocks.
As our work in progress shows, this could have generated results qualitatively in line
with those produced herein, as well as in the related work for the United States.1 Introduction
On October 8, 1992, three weeks after sterling’s departure from the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the European Monetary System, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nor-
man Lamont, established the ﬁr s td i r e c ti n ﬂation target in the history of the United
Kingdom, as a range of 1-4% for annual RPIX1 inﬂation. Since then, U.K. macro-
economic performance has been characterized by low and stable inﬂation, historically
low interest rates, and, as of 2006 Q4, 56 quarters of uninterrupted output growth.
In previous research–see Benati (2004)–we used tests for multiple structural
breaks at unknown points in the sample, and band-pass ﬁltering techniques, to in-
vestigate changes in U.K. economic performance since the end of WWII. Empirical
evidence suggests the inﬂation targeting regime to have been, in a very broad sense,
signiﬁcantly more stable than the previous post-WWII era. First, for both real GDP
growth, and three alternative measures of inﬂation, we identiﬁed break dates around
the time of the introduction of inﬂation targeting, in October 1992. For all four
series, the estimated variance of reduced-form innovations over the most recent sub-
period has been, so far, the lowest of the post-WWII era. Second, the volatility of
the business-cycle components of macroeconomic indicators has been, after October
1992, almost always lower than either under Bretton Woods, or during the 1971-1992
period, often–as in the case of inﬂation and real GDP–markedly so.
Benati (2006) extends the analysis backwards in time to the metallic standard
era, documenting how the inﬂation targeting regime has been characterised, to date,
by the most stable macroeconomic environment in recorded U.K. history, with the
volatilities of the business-cycle components of real GDP, national accounts aggre-
gates, and inﬂation measures having been, post-1992, systematically lower than for
any of the previous monetary regimes/historical periods.
Where does such a remarkable and historically unprecedented stability come from?
Providing an answer to this question is of obvious, crucial importance. If the bulk of
the stability of the post-1992 era were attributable to the impact of the new monetary
framework, we then might be reasonably conﬁdent that macroeconomic instability
was a memory of the past–with the right monetary policy in place, the 1970s could
never return. If, on the other hand, the current stable macroeconomic environment
found its origin in the fact that, in recent years, the U.K. economy has been spared
the large shocks of previous decades, having the best possible monetary framework
in place would not necessarily shield us from a reappearance of macroeconomic tur-
bulence.
In this paper we use a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with
stochastic volatility along the lines of Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005),
and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006), to shed some light on the deep underlying
causes of the Great Moderation in the United Kingdom. Our main objective is to
evaluate the comparative likelihood of two main rival explanations/stories which been
1‘Retail prices index, all items excluding mortgage interest payments’.
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Alan Greenspan’s tenure–the ‘good luck’ versus ‘good policy’ debate. Our main
results may be summarised as follows.
• The evolution of the coeﬃcients of the structural monetary rule in the VAR is
broadly in line with the narrative evidence,2 with, e.g., a comparatively weaker
long-run response to inﬂation before 1979-1980, a marked increase under Mar-
garet Thatcher, and a further increase under inﬂation targeting. Interestingly,
t h ep e r i o dd u r i n gw h i c ht h eU n i t e dK i n g d o mw a sam e m b e ro ft h eE x c h a n g e
Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System was characterised by signif-
icant temporary decreases in the long-run coeﬃcients on both inﬂation, output
growth, and the rate of growth of M4, thus dramatically highlighting how dur-
ing that period U.K. monetary policy–being ‘done in Frankfurt’–was virtually
disconnected from domestic economic conditions. When seen under this perspec-
tive, the crisis of ‘Black Wednesday’ appears, in a sense, all but inevitable.
• Overall, our evidence points towards a dominant role played by shocks in fos-
tering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the most recent period.
Results from counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that (1) the Great
Inﬂation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks,
and to a lesser extent–especially in 1973 and 1979–to supply shocks; (2) im-
posing the 1970s’ monetary rule over the entire sample period would have made
almost no diﬀerence in terms of inﬂation and output growth outcomes; and (3)
alternatively, mechanically ‘bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in
time’ would only have had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode.
Although in line with the literature on the U.S., these results are quite striking,
in particular in the light of the more traditional, narrative approach–detailed, ﬁrst
and foremost, in the work of Ed Nelson and his co-authors3–which suggests that
the monetary policy regime has been an important factor in explaining the Great
Moderation in the United Kingdom. One interpretation that could reconcile the two
sets of results is based on the ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ advocated, for the United
States, by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). In a
nutshell, the idea is that monetary policy was not suﬃciently stabilising (technically:
passive, i.e., such as to give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria) around the time of
the Great Inﬂation, and therefore allowed self-fulﬁlling sunspot shocks, while it has
become stabilising (technically: active, i.e., such as to give rise to a unique equilib-
rium) over the most recent period. As our work in progress4 shows, this could have
generated results qualitatively in line with those produced herein, as well as in the
related work for the United States.
2See e.g. Batini and Nelson (2005).
3See especially Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Batini and Nelson (2005).
4Benati and Surico (2007).
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Moderation, the U.K. experience is especially interesting because, compared with the
United States, it is so extreme: over the last several decades, the United Kingdom
has moved from a situation in which monetary policy was regarded as essentially
useless for the purpose of controlling inﬂation, to one in which, on the contrary,
it is regarded as the crucial instrument. Further, such a sea change in the overall
intellectual attitude towards inﬂation and monetary policy has been enshrined in the
U.K. ‘monetary constitution’, with inﬂation targeting being introduced in October
1992, and with the Bank of England being granted independence, and the Monetary
Policy Committee being created, in May 1997. The SVAR-based evidence produced
herein is therefore all the more striking ...
From a methodological point of view, our paper improves upon the three previ-
ously mentioned studies along several dimensions. Primiceri (2005) only considers
a Cholesky decomposition–which allows him to identify only a monetary policy
shock–and in computing impulse-responses disregards the uncertainty originating
from future time-variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients, which we instead tackle via
Monte Carlo integration. Both Canova and Gambetti (2005) and Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006), on the other hand, do not have a time-varying covariance struc-
ture. While it is true that random-walk time-variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients
introduces a form of heteroskedasticity in the model, a key problem is that, by con-
struction, it induces a close correlation between changes in the VAR’s coeﬃcients and
changes in the covariance structure, which a comparison between Cogley and Sargent
(2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2005) clearly shows not to be in the data, and which,
in general we have no reason to assume to hold.5
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the reduced-form speciﬁ-
cation for the time-varying parameters VAR with stochastic volatility which we use
throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses evidence of time-variation in the reduced-
form properties of the U.K. economy since the beginning of the 1970s, while section
4 turns to structural analysis. Section 5 discusses a possible caveat to interpretating
our results as clearly pointing towards good luck. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Time-Varying Parameters VAR with Stochas-
tic Volatility
In what follows we work with the following time-varying parameters VAR(p)m o d e l :
Yt = B0,t + B1,tYt−1 + ... + Bp,tYt−p +  t ≡ X
0
tθt +  t (1)
5In his comment on Cogley and Sargent (2002), Stock (2002) stresses how, if the data generation
process is characterised by a time-varying volatility structure, imposition of a constant covariance
stucture automatically induces an upward bias in the estimated extent of parameters’ drift in the
VAR, as the algorithm compensates for lack of time-variation in the covariance by ‘blowing up’
time-variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients.
9
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πt,y t,m t being a short-term rate, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the rates of growth of
real GDP and nominal M4,6 respectively (for a description of the data, see Appendix
A).7 The overall sample period is 1959:3-2005:4. For reasons of comparability with
other papers in the literature8 we set the lag order to p=2. Following, e.g., Cogley and
Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006) the VAR’s time-varying parameters, collected in the vector θt,a r e
postulated to evolve according to
p(θt | θt−1, Q)=I(θt) f(θt | θt−1, Q) (2)
with I(θt) being an indicator function rejecting unstable draws–thus enforcing a
stationarity constraint on the VAR–and with f(θt | θt−1, Q) given by
θt = θt−1 + ηt (3)
with ηt ∼ N(0,Q ). The VAR’s reduced-form innovations in (1) are postulated to
be zero-mean normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix Ωt which,
following established practice, we factor as




























with the hi,t evolving as geometric random walks,
lnhi,t =l nhi,t−1 + νi,t (6)
6An important point to stress is that during the period of monetary targeting, at the beginning of
the 1980s, the targeted aggregate was M3, rather than M4. The problem with M3, unfortunately, is
that no quarterly series is available on a consistent basis since the beginning of the 1960s: Capie and
Webber (1985) contains an M3 series for the period 1870:1-1982:4, while an M3 series from the Bank
of England web site (acronym is LPQVWYZ) is available only since 1986:4. So, although unwillingly,
we have basically been compelled to use M4: given that M2, again from the Bank of England web
site (acronym is LPQVWYH), is only available since 1986:3, the only feasible alternative would have
been the monetary base.
7GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the rates of growth of real GDP and nominal M4 have been computed
as the non-annualised quarter-on-quarter rates of growth of the relevant series. The interest rate
has then been rescaled in order to make it conceptually comparable with the other three series.
Speciﬁcally, by deﬁning the quarter-on-quarter and the annualised quarter-on-quarter ﬁgures for the
interest rate as rt and rA
t ,w eh a v ert=(1+rA
t )1/4-1.
8See e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Gambetti,
Pappa, and Canova (2006).
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we postulate the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At–which we collect
in the vector αt ≡ [α21,t, α31,t, ..., α43,t]0–to evolve as driftless random walks,
αt = αt−1 + τt ,( 7 )













































t ut. As discussed in Primiceri (2005), there are two
justiﬁcations for assuming a block-diagonal structure for Vt. First, parsimony, as
the model is already quite heavily parameterized. Second, ‘allowing for a completely
generic correlation structure among diﬀerent sources of uncertainty would preclude
any structural interpretation of the innovations’.9 Finally, following, again, Primiceri
(2005) we adopt the additional simplifying assumption of postulating a block-diagonal
structure for S,t o o – n a m e l y








with S1 ≡ Var(τ21,t), S2 ≡ Var([τ31,t,τ32,t]0),a n dS3 ≡ Var([τ41,t,τ32,t,τ43,t]0),t h u s
implying that the non-zero and non-one elements of At belonging to diﬀerent rows
evolve independently. As discussed in Primiceri (2005, Appendix A.2), this assump-
tion drastically simpliﬁes inference, as it allows to do Gibbs sampling on the non-zero
and non-one elements of At equation by equation.
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. Appendix B discusses our choices for
the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to simulate the
posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional on the data.
3 Reduced-Form Evidence
3.1 The evolution of the VAR’s covariance matrix
The top-left panel of Figure 1 provides a dramatic illustration of the Great Modera-
tion phenomenon, by plotting the median of the time-varying distribution of ln|Ωt|,
which, following Cogley and Sargent (2005),10 w ei n t e r p r e ta sam e a s u r eo ft h et o t a l
9Primiceri (2005, pp. 6-7).
10In turn, they were following Whittle (1953)–see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Section 3.5).
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and 84th percentiles.11 ln|Ωt| is estimated to have reached a peak in 1973:1, just a
few months after the ﬂoating of the pound vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, in June 1972, and
to have systematically fallen ever since, reaching a minimum towards the end of the
sample. Such evidence is compatible with two radically diﬀerent views of the Great
Moderation in the United Kingdom. First, with the ‘good luck’ hypothesis, with the
U.K. economy being hit by comparatively large shocks during the 1970s, and by pro-
gressively smaller ones starting from the end of the 1970s. Second, given that the bulk
of the reduction in ln|Ωt| took place starting from the end of the 1970s-beginning of
the 1980s, with the ‘good policy’ hypothesis, with monetary policy decisively turning
counter-inﬂationary with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, and even more so after
the introduction of inﬂation targeting, in October 1992. In order to be able to dis-
criminate between these two rival hypotheses, however, we will need to wait until the
structural analysis of Section 4.
Turning to the other components of Ωt, the remaining four panels in the top row of
Figure 1 show the evolution of the standard deviations of the VAR’s residuals, in basis
points.12 For three series out of four–inﬂation, output growth, and M4 growth–the
volatility of reduced-form shocks reached a peak around the time of the ﬂoating of the
pound vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, while for the fourth series, the short-term rate, the
peak was reached just a few years later, in 1976:3. Since then, all series’ volatilities
experienced near-monotonic declines, with minima reached either at the very end,
or towards the end of the sample. Especially interesting is the dramatic fall in the
volatilities of reduced-form shocks for inﬂation and output growth–from peaks of
187 and 197 basis points (based on median estimates), respectively, in 1972, to lows
of 44 and 26 basis points, respectively, in the last quarter of the sample–thus clearly
testifying to the exceptional reduction in the U.K. economy’s volatility compared to
the Great Inﬂation period.
3.2 Evolving predictability
In the spirit of Cogley (2005), in this section we measure changes in the four series’
predictability by computing, for each of them, a time-varying multivariate R2 statistic
11Under normality, the 16th and 84th percentiles are the bounds of a one standard deviation
conﬁdence interval, so that on average, for the normal distribution, the interval between these two
percentiles encloses 68% of the distribution of the object of interest.
12In order to correctly interpret the information contained in the Figure, the reader should keep
in mind that inﬂation and the rates of growth of output and M4 have been computed as the non-
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is variable x’s estimated overall time-varying variance; fx,t|T(ω) is the time-varying
estimate of the spectral density of x based on the estimated time-varying VAR; and
σ
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is variable x’s estimated time-varying innovation variance, based on Kolmogorov’s
formula.
Figure 2 shows, for the four series, the medians of the distributions of the time-
varying multivariate R2 statistics, together with the 16th and 84th percentiles, while
Table 1 reports the same objects for four selected quarters. As it was to be expected,
given the (near) unit root behaviour of the short-term rate, its predictability has
remained essentially unchanged at values very close to one over the entire sample pe-
riod, ﬂuctuating, based on median estimates, between 0.88 and 0.95. By contrast, the
predictability of output and M4 growth increased and, respectively, decreased very
slightly over the sample period, reaching, at the very end of the sample, values slightly
below 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. The most interesting pattern of variation, however,
pertains inﬂation: in line with the analogous evidence for the United States of Stock
and Watson (2007) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007), U.K. inﬂation’s predictability is
estimated to have peaked around the time of the Great Inﬂation, oscillating (based on
median estimates) between 0.53 and 0.60 over the period 1975-1980; to have signiﬁ-
cantly decreased around the start of the Thatcher disinﬂation; and to have ﬂuctuated
at comparatively low levels ever since, reaching 0.16 at the very end of the sample,
in 2005:4. Interestingly, inﬂation predictability experienced temporary increases cor-
responding, ﬁrst, to the so-called ‘Lawson boom’ of the second half of the 1980s; and
second, to the economic slowdown at the very end of the century.
Having discussed time-variation in the economy’s predictability, let’s now turn to
the extent of uncertainty associated with future projections, as captured by model-
generated ‘fan charts’ for the four series of interest.
13Given the enormous computational burden associated with re-estimating the model every single
quarter, both this section’s exercise, and next section’s one, have been performed based on the
smoothed (i.e, two-sided) output of the Gibbs sampler conditional on the full sample. This implies
that both this section’s predictability measures, and next section’s k-step ahead projections, should
only be regarded as approximations to the authentic out-of-sample objects that would result from
a proper recursive estimation. (Unfortunately, it is not clear how to even gauge an idea of the
goodness of such approximation.)
13
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The ‘fan charts’ for inﬂation and output growth published in the Bank of England’s
quarterly Inﬂation Report–showing the deciles of the Monetary Policy Committee’s
collective, subjective probability distribution for the two variables at horizons up to
three years–play a crucial role in the Bank’s communication strategy with the mar-
kets, and as such are widely discussed in the ﬁnancial press. Given the marked changes
in some of the reduced-form properties of the U.K. economy since the beginning of
the 1970s documented in the previous sections, it is of interest to see how the fan
charts for the four variables in the VAR have evolved along the sample.14
Figure 3 shows, for the four variables, the standard deviations (in basis points) of
k-step ahead projections at horizons up to 20 quarters,15 computed by stochastically
simulating the VAR into the future 1,000 times.16 Given the enormous computational
burden associated with recursive estimation of the model for every single quarter, this
section’s exercise, exactly as the previous section’s, has been performed based on the
smoothed (i.e, two-sided) output of the Gibbs sampler conditional on the full sample.
This implies that, once again, the k-step ahead projections should only be regarded
as approximations to the authentic out-of-sample objects that would result from a
proper recursive estimation. In order to make the original results from the stochastic
simulations visually more appealing and easier to read, we have smoothed them along
the time dimension with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass ﬁlter.17
For all variables, and at all horizons, the standard deviations exhibit a broadly
similar declining pattern over the sample period, with peaks at the time of the
Great Inﬂation, and a near-monotonic decrease since then. Focussing on the two-
year horizon–the one traditionally associated with monetary policy decisions–the
14Strictly speaking, the fan charts generated by our VAR are not comparable to those found in
the Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report.F i r s t ,t h eInﬂation Report’s fan charts reﬂect the subjective
collective judgement of the Monetary Policy Committee, while, as we discuss below, our fan charts
have been generated by stochastically simulating the VAR into the future. Second, and crucially,
our fan charts uniquely reﬂect the information contained in the four series we analyse, while those
of the MPC distill the much wider range of information which the Bank of England tracks on a
continuous basis.
15Once again, as in Section 3.1, in order to correctly interpret the information contained in the
Figure, the reader should keep in mind that inﬂation and the rates of growth of output and M4 have
been computed as the non-annualised quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the relevant series, and
that the short-term rate has been rescaled accordingly.
16Speciﬁcally, for every quarter, and for each of the 1,000 simulations, we start by sampling the
current state of the economy from the Gibbs sampler’s output for that quarter, by drawing a random
number from a uniform distribution deﬁned over [1; 1,000]. Conditional on this draw for the current
state of the economy at t, we then simulate the VAR 20 quarters into the future.
17Speciﬁcally, Figure 3 shows the components with periodicity beyond eight years. Given that
the original, raw results only displayed strong trends plus some noise, but not much in the way
of business-cycle components, the diﬀerence between the original raw results and those shown in
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tion, output growth, and M4 growth have decreased from peaks of 86, 301, 264, and
353 basis points during the 1970s18 to 37, 82, 68, and 172 basis points,19 respec-
tively, in the last quarter of the sample, 2005:4, thus testifying to the dramatic fall in
macroeconomic uncertainty across the board intervened since the time of the Great
Inﬂation.
Summing up, in line with the analyses of Benati (2004), Cogley, Morozov, and
Sargent (2003), and Benati (2006), our reduced-form evidence points towards a dra-
matic stabilisation of the U.K. economy since the times of the Great Inﬂation, with
signiﬁcant decreases in both the VAR’s total prediction variance and the volatility of
reduced-form innovations for both inﬂation and output growth.20 In order to under-
stand the deep, underlying causes of this remarkable stabilisation we turn now to a
structural analysis.
4 Structural Analysis
In the spirit of Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006), in this section we impose, on the estimated time-varying reduced-
form VAR, identifying restrictions on a period-by-period basis. We identify four
structural shocks–a monetary policy shock ( M
t ), a supply shock ( S
t ), a demand
non-policy shock ( D
t ), and a money demand shock ( MD
t )–by imposing the following








short rate ++? +
inﬂation —+— —
output growth —+ + —
M4 growth —+? +
? = left unconstrained
It can be trivially shown that these restrictions are suﬃcient to uniquely identify
the four shocks. We compute the time-varying structural impact matrix, A0,t,v i a
18Speciﬁcally, in 1979:2, 1974:4, 1972:1, and 1972:1, respectively.
19Corresponding to decreases of -57.0, -72.8, -74.2, and -51.3 per cent, respectively.
20Benati (2004), Cogley, Morozov, and Sargent (2003) and Benati (2006) extensively document
a further important change in the reduced-form properties of the U.K. economy under inﬂation
targeting, i.e. the complete disappearance of inﬂation persistence. Benati (2006), in particular,
shows how, under the current monetary regime, U.K. inﬂation has been, so far, slightly negatively
serially correlated, which is compatible with the notion that the current regime is, de facto,ahybrid
between inﬂation and price level targeting.
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Speciﬁcally, let Ωt = PtDtP0
t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the
VAR’s time-varying covariance matrix Ωt,a n dl e t ˜ A0,t ≡ PtD
1
2
t .W ed r a wa nN × N
matrix, K,f r o mt h eN(0, 1) distribution, we take the QR decomposition of K–that
is, we compute matrices Q and R such that K=Q · R–and we compute the time-
varying structural impact matrix as A0,t= ˜ A0,t·Q0.I ft h ed r a ws a t i s ﬁes the restrictions
we keep it, otherwise we discard it and we keep drawing until the restrictions are sat-
isﬁed, as in the Rubio-Waggoner-Zha code SRestrictRWZalg.m which implements
their algorithm.
4.1 The evolution of the monetary policy stance
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the U.K. monetary policy stance since the beginning
of the 1970s, by plotting the medians of the time-varying distributions of the long-run
coeﬃcients on inﬂation, output growth, and M4 growth in the structural monetary
policy rule,22 together with the 16th and 84th percentiles.23 In what follows we disre-
gard the signiﬁcant extent of econometric uncertainty associated with the estimates,
which unfortunately is quite common with time-varying parameters models, and we
exclusively focus on median estimates.
4.1.1 The Great Inﬂation
Starting from the Great Inﬂation episode, until the very end of 1970s, coinciding
with the beginning of the Thatcher disinﬂation, the coeﬃcients on both inﬂation and
output growth are estimated to have been quite remarkably low, ﬂuctuating between
0.2 and 0.3, and between -0.1 and 0, respectively. In the light of such a weak-to-
non-existent responsiveness of U.K. monetary policy to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
it is therefore not surprising that the 1970s saw high and highly volatile inﬂation–
peaking, on an annual basis, at 28.1 per cent in 1975:3–and highly volatile output
growth. An important point to stress is that the large ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, output
growth, and money growth during the Great Inﬂation episode suggest that the pa-
rameters of the structural monetary rule are most likely well-estimated–under this
respect it is interesting to notice how uncertainty concerning the long-run coeﬃcient
on inﬂation reached historical lows during the second half of the 1970s ... As we argue
below, on the other hand, the remarkable macroeconomic stability of the inﬂation
targeting era creates, under this respect, crucial problems: since, post-October 1992,
nothing basically moves much, it can be reasonably argued that, for this period, the
parameters of the structural monetary rule might have been poorly estimated.
21See at http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.
22For each quarter t, and each single iteration of the Gibbs sampler, the long-run coeﬃcients can
be trivially computed via simple manipulations of the estimated structural monetary rule.
23We do not report the corresponding objects for the lagged interest rate as they are not especially
interesting, but they are available from the author upon request.
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The launch of the Thatcher disinﬂation in 1979 was accompanied by clear, although
not dramatic, increases in the coeﬃcients on both inﬂation and M4 growth, and by
a gradual, mild increase in the coeﬃcient on output growth. A comparison with the
Volcker disinﬂation in the United States is, under this respect, illuminating. Based
exactly on the same methodology adopted herein, Benati and Mumtaz (2007) esti-
mate the long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation and M2 growth to have increased from
slightly below one and slightly below zero, respectively, around mid-1979, to about 3
and 0.6 in 1985. The coeﬃcient on output growth, on the other hand, is estimated
to have become slightly negative, around -0.5, during the Volcker recession, thus cap-
turing in the starkest possible way the FED’s determination to eradicate inﬂation ‘no
matter what’. The comparison with the disinﬂation which was taking place, exactly
at the same time, across the Atlantic therefore clearly suggests the shift towards a
counter-inﬂationary stance on the part of the U.K. monetary authority to have been
a comparatively mild one ... After peaking in 1983:3, the coeﬃcient on M4 growth
systematically decreased during subsequent years,24 reaching towards the end of the
1980s values comparable to those of the second half of the 1970s. The most striking
feature of those years, however, concerns the long-run coeﬃcient on inﬂation, which
during the entire decade of the 1980s is estimated to have ﬂuctuated between 0.7
and 0.8, signiﬁcantly below unity.25 This reinforces the point we just made in our
comparison with the U.S. experience during the Volcker disinﬂation, and clearly sug-
gests that, even after the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, U.K. monetary policy was
not decisively counter-inﬂationary yet.
These results cast an intriguing light on the United Kingdom’s search, during the
second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, for an external, exchange-rate
based nominal anchor, ﬁrst by shadowing the Deutsche Mark, and then by entering
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System (henceforth, ERM
and EMS, respectively). In a sense, it looks like as if, for some reason, U.K. pol-
icymakers were incapable of providing the economy a strong nominal anchor, and
therefore had to look for it across the Channel.
24Monetary targeting was abandoned in 1985.
25According to the ‘Taylor principle’ a unitary value discriminates between a stabilising and a
non-stabilising monetary rule–i.e. between monetary rules such as to generate determinacy and,
respectively, indeterminacy. It is however important to stress that the most recent literature–see
in particular Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–has highlighted how equilibrium (in)determinacy is,
strictly speaking, a system property, as it depends on the interaction between all of the parameters
of the monetary rule and all of the structural parameters. A unitary value of the long-run coeﬃcient
on inﬂation should therefore be regarded as a broad yardstick of the looseness/toughness of the
monetary stance, and nothing more. So while the remarkably low values taken by the coeﬃcients of
the structural monetary rule in the 1970s clearly point towards the possibility of indeterminacy, for
the 1980s evidence is much less clear-cut ...
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The United Kingdom joined the ERM in October 1990, and suspended ERM member-
ship on ‘Black Wednesday’, September 16, 1992, following a massive wave of currency
speculation. The most striking feature of that period is represented by the large, tem-
porary decreases in the long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output growth, and to
a lesser extent by that on M4 growth,26 thus dramatically highlighting how during
those months U.K. monetary policy–being ‘done in Frankfurt’–was virtually dis-
connected from domestic economic conditions. When seen through these lenses, the
crisis of ‘Black Wednesday’ appears, in a sense, all but inevitable ...
4.1.4 The inﬂation-targeting regime
Three weeks after suspension of EMS membership, on October 8, 1992, the Con-
servative government led by John Major introduced an inﬂation-targeting regime.27
When seen through the lenses of the evolution of the structural monetary rule, the
inﬂation-targeting era has exhibited, to date, two major characteristics:
• the long-run coeﬃcient on M4 growth has been ﬂuctuating at historically low
values, between 0 and 0.3, thus pointing towards the diminished role played by
monetary aggregates within the current monetary framework, especially when
compared with the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1 9 8 0 s .
• The long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output growth, on the other hand,
have dramatically increased when compared with the lows of the ERM period–
reaching, based on median estimates, maxima of about 1.4 and 0.9, respectively,
during the ﬁrst years of the century–thus clearly testifying to the markedly
more aggressively counter-inﬂationary stance which has been adopted under
the current regime.
Under this respect, an important point which we already brieﬂy mentioned in
Section 4.1.1 concerns how reliable the estimated structural monetary rule can be
regarded under the current regime. From a strictly logical point of view, indeed, if
inﬂation and output growth don’t move around suﬃciently, there is no way that the
26According to the estimates reported in Figure 4, the decrease in the long-run coeﬃcients on the
three variables started before the United Kingdom joined the ERM. The simplest and most logical
explanation for this result is that the estimates produced by the Gibbs sampler are, by construction,
two-sided, and in the case of processess experiencing sharp breaks they therefore tend to inevitably
smooth the break, thus ‘mixing the future with the past’, and giving the misleading impression that
the change took place before it actually did.
27Since October 1992, the most signiﬁcant change in the U.K. monetary framework has been the
granting of operational independence to the Bank of England, with the contemporaneous creation
of the Monetary Policy Committee, on May 6, 1997, ﬁve days after Labour’s election victory.
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after October 1992, the U.K. economy has been just strikingly stable, it might rea-
sonably be argued that the estimates of the rule’s coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output
growth are biased towards zero.29 Q u i t eo b v i o u s l y ,t h i sh a si m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o n sf o r
the reliability of counterfactual simulations in which the Monetary Policy Committee
structural monetary rule is imposed over the entire sample period: irrespective of Lu-
cas critique-type arguments, if, because of the just-mentioned problem, the estimated
‘MPC monetary rule’ is weaker than in it is reality, when you impose it over the en-
tire post-WWII sample period you’re obviously going to get potentially non-sensical
results. Because of this, in the next two Section we are going to consider three al-
ternative counterfactuals: one in which the structural shocks are set to zero one at a
time; one in which the MPC m o n e t a r yr u l ei si m p o s e do v e rt h ee n t i r es a m p l ep e r i o d ;
and one in which the 1970’s monetary rule–which, as we previously argued, is most
likely much more reliably estimated than the post-October 1992 one–is imposed over
t h ee n t i r es a m p l ep e r i o d .
4.2 Counterfactual histories
4.2.1 Setting to zero one shock at a time
Figure 5 reports results from a set of counterfactual simulations in which we set to zero
one shock at a time, and we then ‘re-run history’ by keeping all remaining estimated
objects at their historical values.30 The key results emerging from the ﬁgure can be
summarised as follows.
• The monetary policy shock does not appear to have played much of a role, with
the single notable exception of M4 growth during the period between mid-1980s
and mid-1990s.
• The money demand shock only appears to have had a positive impact on inﬂa-
tion around the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1 9 7 0 s .
• As expected, the supply shock had a signiﬁcant positive impact on inﬂation
around the time of the two oil shocks, and a mild positive impact on interest
rates around the time of the second oil shock (but not of the ﬁrst). To put it
28I wish to thank Charlie Bean for an extremely helpful discussion on this issue. In his words,
given that, under the current regime, inﬂation is, to a ﬁrst approximation, a ‘controlled process’, it
is not clear to which extent you can actually identify the parameter on inﬂa t i o ni nt h es t r u c t u r a l
monetary rule.
29Indeed, an estimate close to zero for the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in a Taylor rule is what you
get if you estimate DSGE models for inﬂation targeting countries via maximum likelihood. These
results–which were part of the preliminary work for Benati (2007), and didn’t end up in the ﬁnal
version of the paper–are available upon request.
30By ‘historical values’ we mean the Gibbs sampler output.
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100 basis points lower than they actually turned out to be.
• Finally, as the second row clearly shows, historically the bulk of the action ap-
pears to have come from demand non-policy shocks. If they had been uniformly
equal to zero over the entire sample period, (i) the 1970s’ Great Inﬂation would
have never happened; (ii) M4 growth would have been uniformly lower during
t h ee n t i r ep e r i o du pt oE R Mm e m b e r s h i p ;( iii) output growth would have been
higher around the time of the Great Inﬂation; and (iv) interest rates would
have been uniformly lower during the entire period before inﬂation targeting,
and marginally higher during the most recent years.
Summing up, based on this exercise–which, it is important to stress, is not vul-
nerable to the Lucas critique, because we are only manipulating shocks–the Great
Inﬂation was due, ﬁrst and foremost, to demand non-policy, and, to a lesser extent,
to supply shocks.
Let’s now turn to two alternative sets of counterfactual simulations which are,
instead, vulnerable to the Lucas critique.
4.2.2 Bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in time
Figure 6 reports results from 1,000 counterfactual simulations31 in which we ‘bring
the Monetary Policy Committee back in time’, imposing the post-May 1997 monetary
rule over the entire sample period.32 As the second row clearly shows, with the MPC
monetary rule in place over the entire sample period (i) money growth would have
been signiﬁcantly lower during the ‘Great Inﬂation’ episode; (ii)i n ﬂation would have
been lower, but not signiﬁcantly so, with a peak impact equal to about minus four
percentage points around mid-1970s; (iii)o u t p u tg r o w t hw o u l dh a v eb e e nm a r g i n a l l y
lower during the 1970s-1980s; and (iv) interest rates would have been slightly higher,
up to a maximum of about two percentage points, around the time of the Great
Inﬂation.
31As it has been well known for a long time, structural VAR-based counterfactual simulations are
vulnerable to the Lucas critique, so the results of this section should necessarily be taken with a
grain of salt. It has to be stresed, however, that in spite of this well-known caveat, counterfactual
simulations are routinely used in the structural VAR literature. The counterfactual we are perform-
ing here, for example, is conceptually akin to what Sims and Zha (2006) do (see their Section VII,
‘Historical Counterfactuals’).
32Speciﬁcally, for each simulation j=1, 2, ..., N,a te a c hq u a r t e rt=p+1, p+2, ..., T we draw three
random numbers, τ, indexing the post-May 1997 quarter from which we draw the elements of the
structural monetary rule; and κt and κτ, indexing the iterations of the Gibbs sampler at times t
and, respectively, τ from which we draw the state of the economy. (All three numbers are deﬁned
over appropriate uniform distributions.) We then take all of the elements of the monetary rule from
iteration κτ of the Gibbs sampler for quarter τ, while we take everything else from iteration κt for
quarter t. We start each counterfactual simulation conditional on the ﬁrst p actual historical values
of the vector Yt.
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There are, however, two caveats to these results. The former one, which has been
well known for years, has to do with the Lucas critique. We’ll not discuss it here,
as, ﬁrst, as we said, it has been well known for a long time. And second, within the
SVAR framework there’s not really much that we can do about it–the only way to
eﬀectively deal with it would be to use a structural (DSGE) model.
The latter caveat, on the other hand, has to do with the point we discussed in
sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.4, namely the comparatively greater reliability of the estimates
of the parameters of the structural monetary rule for the 1970s, and the comparatively
lesser reliability of the estimates for the most recent years. Because of this, we now
turn to the alternative counterfactual in which we impose the 1970s’ monetary rule
over the entire sample.
4.2.3 Imposing the 1970’s monetary rule over the entire sample
Figure 7 reports results from this alternative counterfactual. The two striking results
from this exercise are that, with the 1970s ’monetary rule imposed over the entire
sample period,
• inﬂation would have been essentially the same as what it has historically been,
and
• output growth would have been marginally higher during the 1980s.
Apart from this, interest rates would have been marginally lower during the 1980s,
and M4 growth would have been higher during the 1980s and the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1 9 9 0 s ,
and lower during the most recent years.
Given that the 1970s ’monetary rule is most likely precisely estimated, these re-
sults provide–up to Lucas critique-type arguments–the strongest possible evidence
that the luck of the draw–as opposed to good or bad policy–has been the dominant
force in post-WWII U.K. macroeconomic history. It is worth stressing how these
results are conceptually exactly in line with those obtained for the United States
by Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Canova and
Gambetti (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006), and Benati and Mumtaz
(2007).
4.3 Changes in the transmission of monetary policy shocks
Finally, Figure 8 plots, for the four series, the time-varying median generalised impulse-
response functions (henceforth, IRFs) to a 25 basis points monetary policy shock,
while Figure 9 shows the same objects, together with the16th and 84th percentiles
of the distributions, for four selected dates. Generalised IRFs have been computed
via the Monte Carlo integration procedure described in Appendix C, which allows to
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structure. Due to the computational intensity of such a procedure, IRFs have been
computed only every four quarters, starting from 1972:1.
Both ﬁgures, especially Figure 8, point towards several interesting changes in the
economy’s response to a monetary policy shock. Speciﬁcally (i) the response of the
nominal rate does not exhibit much time-variation over the sample period, with the
single notable exception of the period of ERM membership, thus testifying, once
again, to the uniqueness of that period in post-WWII U.K. macroeconomic history;
(ii) intriguingly, inﬂation’s response exhibits a clear ‘price puzzle’ around the time of
the Great Inﬂation, but nothing before, and essentially nothing after; and (iii)t h e
response of M4 growth appears to have progressively become stronger as time went
by. None of these ﬁndings, however, questions the previously discussed main result
of a dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more stable macroeconomic
environment of the last 15-20 years.
5A Caveat: The ‘Indeterminacy Hypothesis’
Taken at face value, our results clearly point towards good luck as the most plau-
sible explanation for the remarkable macroeconomic stability enjoyed by the British
economy over the most recent era. But are there any caveats to our interpretation
of these results? We believe that there is an important one, which is currently be-
ing investigated in our related work in progress.33 In order to provide the reader
with a better and fuller understanding of our position, however, let’s start by brieﬂy
discussing evidence coming from an alternative approach.
5.1 Evidence from a narrative approach: the crucial role of
the U.K. experience
Although the literature on the Great Moderation has been dominated, so far, by a
strictly econometric approach–based on either reduced-form techniques, as in the
case of Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), or on structural methods, as in (e.g.)
Primiceri (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006)–a
key point to stress is that econometric evidence is not the only kind of evidence we
can rely on. Historical and ‘narrative’ evidence–detailing, in particular, the evolu-
tion of the overall intellectual climate surrounding (monetary) policymaking over the
last several decades–may provide useful and, as we will argue, sometimes crucial
additional insights on the comparative likelihood of ‘good luck’ as opposed to ‘good
policy’ as the explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years.34
33Benati and Surico (2007).
34For the more technically oriented readers, who may be tempted to just shrug such arguments
oﬀ, we would like to point out that one of the single most inﬂuential macroeconomic books of the XX
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subsequent stabilisation35 are, in our opinion, very far from providing decisive evi-
dence in favor of either hypothesis, evidence for the United Kingdom–coming, ﬁrst
and foremost, from the work of Ed Nelson and his co-authors36–is on the other hand
extremely sharp.
As pointed out by Nelson and Nikolov (2004) in their extensive analysis of the
broad intellectual climate surrounding monetary policymaking in the United Kingdom
in the 1960s and 1970s, during those years
[m]onetary policy was not seen as essential for inﬂation control;t h e
latter, instead, was largely delegated to incomes policy (wage and price
controls). [...] Essentially, UK policymakers viewed monetary policy as
disconnected from inﬂation for two reasons. First, inﬂation was perceived
as largely driven by factors other than the output gap; secondly, policy-
makers were highly sceptical about the ability of monetary policy to aﬀect
aggregate demand or the output gap appreciably. [This] led to a combi-
nation of easy monetary policy and attempts to control inﬂation through
other devices, and contributed heavily to the breakout of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
1960s and 1970s. (emphasis added)
Alec Cairncross, who served as a Treasury oﬃcial37 during that period, provides
support to the position of Nelson and Nikolov (2004), by stressing how38
[i]n the eﬀort to limit inﬂation there was little thought of reliance on
monetary policy, much less exclusive reliance on monetary policy [...]. The
prevailing view was that of the Radcliﬀe Committee [...]: monetary policy
itself had limited usefulness in controlling inﬂation. [...] Even after the
IMF seminar in 1968, the Treasury remained sceptical [...] of the inﬂuence
of monetary policy on the rate of inﬂation, and was anxious to keep rates
as low as possible in the interests of holding down interest on government
debt and encouraging ﬁxed investment. (emphasis added)
century, Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History,w a sentirely based on the narrative approach.
For more recent examples of this approach, see the work of Christina and David Romer.
35See in particular the work of DeLong (1997).
36To be precise, the work of Ed Nelson and co-authors is not uniquely based on the narrative ap-
proach. Although Batini and Nelson (2005) presents a purely narrative analysis, Nelson and Nikolov
(2004) (e.g.) also presents econometric work based on an estimated DSGE model. Interestingly–
and in line with this section’s main point–the authors ﬁnd ‘that inaccurate estimates of the degree
of excess demand in the economy contributed signiﬁcantly to the outbreak. But [they] also ﬁnd a
major role for the failure at the time to recognize the importance of monetary policy, as opposed to
nonmonetary devices, in controlling inﬂation.’
37An important point to stress that, until May 1997, U.K. monetary policy had been formulated
by the Treasury. For a brief history of U.K. monetary arrangements, see Benati (2006, section 2).
38See Cairncross (1996), as quoted in Nelson and Nikolov (2004).
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intellectual context within which policymaking was then formulated in the United
Kingdom and of the speciﬁc objectives towards which monetary policy was then
directed, and provides clear support for Nelson and Nikolov’s previously mentioned
assertion that such intellectual climate led to a combination of lax monetary policy
and attempts to control inﬂation via nonmonetary means.
In their painstaking reconstruction of theU . K . ’ sl o n ga n dw i n d i n g‘ r o c k yr o a dt o
stability’, Batini and Nelson (2005) conclude that there were three crucial steps in
the process leading from the old boom-and-bust to the stability of the more recent
era.
The ﬁrst was the acceptance of monetary policy as the key tool for
managing aggregate demand; this acceptance took place in the early
1970s. The second was the shaking-oﬀ of cost-push views of inﬂation
in favor of a monetary view, allowing monetary policy to become the gov-
ernment’s anti-inﬂation weapon; this shift occurred in 1979. The third
was the discarding of ineﬀective monetary policy instruments, which had
given U.K. policymakers the false notion that they could alter the stance
of monetary policy without aﬀecting short-term interest rates or the mon-
etary base. This process culminated [...] in 1985.
To sum up, over the last several decades the United Kingdom has moved from a
situation in which monetary policy was regarded as essentially useless for the purpose
of controlling inﬂation, to one in which, on the contrary, it is regarded as the crucial
instrument. Further, such a sea change in the overall intellectual attitude towards
inﬂation and monetary policy has been enshrined in the U.K. ‘monetary constitution’,
with inﬂation targeting being introduced in October 1992, and with the Bank of
England being granted independence, and the Monetary Policy Committee being
created, in May 1997. Given such dramatic changes in both macroeconomic thinking
and monetary policymaking since the beginning of the 1960s, we would be naturally
led to expect that econometric methods, when applied to U.K. post-WWII data,
would point towards good policy as the explanation of the transition from the Great
Inﬂation to the Great Moderation. As this paper has clearly shown, however, this
is deﬁnitely not the case, with structural VAR methods strongly and consistently
pointing, on the contrary, towards good luck.
But so, how can we reconcile the narrative and VAR evidence?
5.2 Reconsidering the VAR evidence: the ‘indeterminacy hy-
pothesis’
B a s e do nD S G Em o d e l s ,t h ew o r ko fC l a r i d a ,G a l i ,a n dG e r t l e r( 2 0 0 0 )a n dL u -
bik and Schorfheide (2004) has suggested that, in the post-WWII U.S., the move
from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation was caused by the switch from
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terminate equilibrium. In a nutshell, the argument is that, before Paul Volcker’s
October 1979 ‘Saturday Night Special’, U.S. monetary policy was not suﬃciently
strongly counter-inﬂationary, thus allowing for equilibrium indeterminacy, i.e. for a
multiplicity (technically, an inﬁnity) of possible solutions, while after October 1979
a more decisively counter-inﬂationary policy stance eﬀectively ruled out the possi-
bility of multiple solutions, thus guaranteeing equilibrium determinacy (i.e., solution
uniqueness). Given that–as shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004)–under indeterminacy macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are char-
acterised by greater persistence and volatility, the ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ provides
a simple and theoretically elegant explanation of the transition from the Great In-
ﬂation to the Great Moderation in line with the narrative evidence of, e.g. DeLong
(1997) and Romer and Romer (2002).
In order to reconcile the evidence coming from the two approaches, in Benati and
Surico (2007) we therefore consider the following, simple experiment.
Suppose that Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) are right, so that the truth was, for the United States, ‘bad policy’
(i.e., indeterminacy) before October 1979, and ‘good policy’ (i.e., deter-
minacy) thereafter. Would structural VARs be capable of uncovering the
truth?
Speciﬁcally, we take the simple New Keynesian workhorse model of Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000), we simulate it conditional on the monetary rules they estimated
for the two regimes, and we apply structural VAR methods to the simulated data.39
In order to make our results as sharp as possible, (i) we keep the volatilities of all the
structural shocks–including the monetary policy shocks–constant across the two
regimes; (ii) we set the volatility of the sunspot shock under indeterminacy equal to
zero; and (iii) we keep all the remaining structural parameters (the Phillips curve
slope and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) constant. By construction, in
our experiment everything is therefore uniquely driven by a move from passive to
active monetary policy. Our results suggest that evidence similar to that produced
within the structural VAR-based literature–including the present work–can be gen-
erated within a framework in which everything is driven by a move from bad to good
policy. In particular,
(1) a shift from indeterminacy to determinacy can reproduce the main qualitative
features of the Great Moderation. In particular, the shift is associated with decreases
in both the total prediction variance of the system, and in the variances of each
individual series.
39Identiﬁcation is achieved by imposing, on the estimated reduced-form VAR, the sign restrictions
implied by the theoretical model on impact. (Since, under indeterminacy, we consider the so-called
‘continuity’ solution–see Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–the signs
on impact are identical under the two regimes.)
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in the structural VARs across regimes points towards the incorrect conclusion that
changes in the systematic component of monetary policy did not play a signiﬁcant
role in causing changes of the DGP.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
So, was it good luck? Based on our results–which, it is worth pointing out, are
broadly in line with the evidence for the U.S. produced by Stock and Watson (2002),
Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Canova and Gambetti (2005), Gambetti,
Pappa, and Canova (2006), and Benati and Mumtaz (2007)–it looks like it was
indeed. To recapitulate, results from counterfactual simulations show that (1) the
Great Inﬂation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks,
and to a lesser extent–especially in 1973 and 1979–to supply shocks; (2) imposing
the 1970s’ monetary rule over the entire sample period would have made almost no
diﬀerence in terms of inﬂation and output growth outcomes; and (3) alternatively,
mechanically ‘bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in time’ would only have
had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode.
We have however discussed a possible, inportant caveat to this interpretation of
our results, based on the notion that, in the bad old days of the boom-and-bust, the
U.K. economy was under indeterminacy. If that’s the case, the preliminary results
from related work in progress of ours suggest a possible way of reconciling the evidence
produced in the present paper with the narrative evidence coming from the work of
Ed Nelson and his co-authors.
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Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for both real GDP (ABMI) and the GDP deﬂator
(YBGB) are from the Oﬃce for National Statistics. A quarterly seasonally unadjusted
series for the short-term government bond yield (series’ code: 11261A..ZF...) is from
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. A quarterly
seasonally adjusted M4 series is from the Bank of England database (series’acronym
is LPQAUYN).
B Details of the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Pro-
cedure
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. The next two subsections describe our
choices for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to sim-
ulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional
on the data, while the third section discusses how we check for convergence of the
Markov chain to the ergodic distribution.
B.1 Priors
For the sake of simplicity, the prior distributions for the initial values of the states–
θ0, α0,a n dh0–which we postulate all to be normal, are assumed to be independent
both from one another, and from the distribution of the hyperparameters. In order
to calibrate the prior distributions for θ0, α0 and h0 we estimate a time-invariant
version of (1) based on the ﬁrst 8 years of data, from 1959:3 to 1966:4, and we set
θ0 ∼ N
h
ˆ θOLS,4 · ˆ V (ˆ θOLS)
i
(B1)
As for α0 and h0 we proceed as follows. Let ˆ ΣOLS be the estimated covariance matrix
of  t from the time-invariant VAR, and let C be the lower-triangular Choleski factor
of ˆ ΣOLS–i.e., CC0 = ˆ ΣOLS. We set
lnh0 ∼ N(lnµ0,10 × I4) (B2)
where µ0 is a vector collecting the logarithms of the squared elements on the diag-
onal of C. We then divide each column of C by the corresponding element on the
diagonal–let’s call the matrix we thus obtain ˜ C–and we set
α0 ∼ N[˜ α0, ˜ V (˜ α0)] (B3)
where ˜ α0–which, for future reference, we deﬁne as ˜ α0 ≡ [˜ α0,11, ˜ α0,21, ..., ˜ α0,61]0–is a
vector collecting all the non-zero and non-one elements of ˜ C−1 (i.e, the elements below
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June 2007the diagonal), and its covariance matrix, ˜ V (˜ α0),i sp o s t u l a t e dt ob ed i a g o n a l ,w i t h
each individual (j,j) element equal to 10 times the absolute value of the corresponding
j-th element of ˜ α0. Such a choice for the covariance matrix of α0 is clearly arbitrary,
but is motivated by our goal to scale the variance of each individual element of α0 in
such a way as to take into account of the element’s magnitude.
Turning to the hyperparameters, we postulate independence between the para-
meters corresponding to the three matrices Q, S,a n dZ–an assumption we adopt
uniquely for reasons of convenience–and we make the following, standard assump-






with prior degrees of freedom T0 and scale matrix T0 ¯ Q. In order to minimize the
impact of the prior, thus maximizing the inﬂu e n c eo fs a m p l ei n f o r m a t i o n ,w es e tT0
equal to the minimum value allowed, the length of θt plus one. As for ¯ Q, we calibrate
it as ¯ Q= γ × ˆ ΣOLS, setting γ=3.5×10−4, the same value used by Cogley and Sargent
(2005).
The three blocks of S are assumed to follow inverted Wishart distributions, with




















As for ¯ S1, ¯ S2 and ¯ S3, we calibrate them based on ˜ α0 in (B3) as ¯ S1=10−3 ×|˜ α0,11|,
¯ S2=10−3×diag([|˜ α0,21|,|˜ α0,31|]0) and ¯ S3=10−3×diag([|˜ α0,41|,|˜ α0,51|,|˜ α0,61|]0). Such a
calibration is consistent with the one we adopted for Q,a si ti se q u i v a l e n tt os e t t i n g
¯ S1, ¯ S2 and ¯ S3 equal to 10−4 times the relevant diagonal block of ˜ V (˜ α0) in (B3).
Finally, as for the variances of the stochastic volatility innovations, we follow Cogley













B.2 Simulating the posterior distribution
We simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states condi-
tional on the data via the following MCMC algorithm, combining elements of Prim-
iceri (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005). In what follows, xt denotes the
entire history of the vector x up to time t–i.e. xt ≡ [x0
1, x0
2,, x0
t]0–while T is the
sample length.
(a) Drawing the elements of θt Conditional on Y T, αT,a n dHT,t h eo b s e r v a t i o n
equation (1) is linear, with Gaussian innovations and a known covariance matrix.
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Conditional on αT, HT,a n dV , the standard Kalman ﬁlter recursions nail down the
ﬁrst element on the right hand side of (??), p(θT|Y T,α T,HT,V) = N(θT,P T),w i t h
PT being the precision matrix of θT produced by the Kalman ﬁlter. The remaining
elements in the factorization can then be computed via the backward recursion algo-
rithm found, e.g., in Kim and Nelson (2000), or Cogley and Sargent (2005, appendix
B.2.1). Given the conditional normality of θt,w eh a v e
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t (θt+1 − θt) (B10)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP
−1
t+1|tPt|t (B11)
which provides, for each t from T-1 to 1, the remaining elements in (1), p(θt|θt+1,
Y T, αT, HT, V ) = N(θt|t+1, Pt|t+1). Speciﬁcally, the backward recursion starts with
a draw from N(θT,P T),c a l li t˜ θT Conditional on ˜ θT, (B10)-(B11) give us θT−1|T and
PT−1|T, thus allowing us to draw ˜ θT−1 from N(θT−1|T,P T−1|T),a n ds oo nu n t i lt=1.
(b) Drawing the elements of αt Conditional on Y T, θ
T,a n dHT, following Prim-
iceri (2005), we draw the elements of αt a sf o l l o w s .E q u a t i o n( 1 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
At˜ Yt ≡ At(Yt-X
0
tθt)=At t ≡ ut,w i t hV a r ( ut)=Ht,n a m e l y
˜ Y2,t = −α21,t˜ Y1,t + u2,t (B12)
˜ Y3,t = −α31,t˜ Y1,t − α32,t˜ Y2,t + u3,t (B13)
˜ Y4,t = −α41,t˜ Y1,t − α42,t˜ Y2,t − α43,t˜ Y3,t + u4,t (B14)
–plus the identity ˜ Y1,t = u1,t–where [˜ Y1,t, ˜ Y2,t, ˜ Y3,t, ˜ Y4,t]0 ≡ ˜ Yt. Based on the ob-
servation equations (B12)-(B14), and the transition equation (7), the elements of
αt can then be drawn by applying the same algorithm we described in the previ-
ous paragraph separately to (B12), (B13) and (B14). The assumption that S has
the block-diagonal structure (9) is in this respect crucial, although, as stressed by
Primiceri (2005, Appendix D), it could in principle be relaxed.
(c) Drawing the elements of Ht Conditional on Y T, θ
T,a n dαT, the orthogo-
nalised innovations ut ≡ At(Yt-X
0
tθt),w i t hV a r ( ut)=Ht, are observable. Following
Cogley and Sargent (2002), we then sample the hi,t’s by applying the univariate al-
gorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (2004) element by element.40
(d) Drawing the hyperparameters Finally, conditional on Y T, θ
T, HT,a n dαT,
the innovations to θt, αt,t h ehi,t’s are observable, which allows us to draw the
40For details, see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Appendix B.2.5).
32
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 769
June 2007hyperparameters–the elements of Q, S1, S2 S3,a n dt h eσ2
i–from their respective
distributions.
Summing up, the MCMC algorithm simulates the posterior distribution of the
states and the hyperparameters, conditional on the data, by iterating on (a)-(d). In
what follows we use a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations to converge to the ergodic
distribution, and after that we run 10,000 more iterations sampling every 10th draw
in order to reduce the autocorrelation across draws.41
B.3 Assessing the convergence of the Markov chain to the
ergodic distribution
Following Primiceri (2005), we assess the convergence of the Markov chain by inspect-
ing the autocorrelation properties of the ergodic distribution’s draws. Speciﬁcally, in
what follows we consider the draws’ ineﬃciency factors (henceforth, IFs), deﬁned as
the inverse of the relative numerical eﬃciency measure of Geweke (1992),






where S(ω) is the spectral density of the sequence of draws from the Gibbs sampler
for the quantity of interest at the frequency ω. We estimate the spectral densities by
smoothing the periodograms in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral
window. Following Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), we select the bandwidth parameter
automatically via the procedure introduced by Beltrao and Bloomﬁeld (1987).
Figure 10 shows the draws’ IFs for the models’ hyperparameters–i.e., the free
elements of the matrices Q, Z,a n dS–and for the states, i.e. the time-varying coef-
ﬁcients of the VAR (the θt), the volatilities (the hi,t’s), and the non-zero elements of
the matrix At.A st h eﬁgure clearly shows, the autocorrelation of the draws is uni-
formly very low, being in the vast majority of cases around or below 3–as stressed by
Primiceri (2005, Appendix B), values of the IFs below or around twenty are generally
regarded as satisfactory.
C Computing Generalised Impulse-Response Func-
tions
This appendix describes the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use in section __
to compute generalised IRFs to a monetary policy shock. In order to reduce the
computational burden, we only perform the exercise every four quarters starting in
1968Q1. For every quarter t out of four, we perform the following procedure 1,000
times.
41In this we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005). As stressed by Cogley and Sargent (2005), however,
this has the drawback of ‘increasing the variance of ensemble averages from the simulation’.
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pler’s output. Given the current state of the economy, repeat the following procedure
100 times. Draw four independent N(0, 1) variates–the four structural shocks–and









t are the monetary policy, demand non-policy, supply, and money demand
structural shocks, respectively, compute the reduced-form shocks  t at time t.S i m -
ulate both the VAR’s time-varying parameters, the θt, and the covariance matrix of
its reduced-form innovations, Ωt, 20 quarters into the future. Based on the simulated
Ωt, randomly draw reduced-form shocks from t+1 to t+20. Based on the simulated
θt, and on the sequence of reduced-form shocks from t to t+20, compute simulated
paths for the three endogenous variables. Call these simulated paths as ˆ X
j
t,t+20, j =
1, .., 100. Repeat the same procedure 100 times based on exactly the same simulated
paths for the VAR’s time-varying parameters, the θt; the same reduced-form shocks
at times t+1 to t+20; and the same structural shocks eD
t , eS
t ,a n deMD
t at time t,b u t
setting eR
t to one. Call these simulated paths as ˜ X
j
t,t+20. For each of the 100 iterations
deﬁne irf
j
t,t+20 ≡ ˆ X
j
t,t+20 − ˜ X
j
t,t+20. Finally, compute each of the 1,000 generalised
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June 2007Table 1 Measuring changes in predicta-
bility: time-varying multivariate R2’s in
selected quarters (median and 16th and
84th percentiles)
Short rate Inﬂation
1972:2 0.937 [0.892; 0.966] 0.418 [0.233; 0.648]
1982:2 0.931 [0.892; 0.958] 0.358 [0.202; 0.575]
1992:2 0.925 [0.884; 0.959] 0.361 [0.192; 0.580]
2002:2 0.953 [0.918; 0.976] 0.351 [0.191; 0.551]
Output growth M4 growth
1972:2 0.127 [0.065; 0.227] 0.677 [0.524; 0.798]
1982:2 0.196 [0.096; 0.365] 0.535 [0.385; 0.701
1992:2 0.529 [0.308; 0.753] 0.509 [0.346; 0.677]
2002:2 0.521 [0.308; 0.743] 0.409 [0.249; 0.604]
T a b l e2 T h ew i d t ho ft h e‘ f a nc h a r t s ’ :
standard deviations (in basis points) of
k-step-ahead projections
Short rate Inﬂation
k=1 k=4 k=8 k=1 k=4 k=8
1972:2 24 54 75 179 219 257
1982:2 26 62 86 131 159 189
1992:2 15 36 48 75 92 113
2002:2 10 24 37 51 61 74
Output growth M4 growth
k=1 k=4 k=8 k=1 k=4 k=8
1972:2 194 222 257 169 274 327
1982:2 110 134 159 118 184 224
1992:2 52 74 98 100 142 181
2002:2 35 46 67 99 13 165
The raw results from the stochastic simulations
have been smoothed via the Christiano and
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Figure 3: The width and shape of the ‘fan charts’: standard deviations (in basis
points) of k-step ahead projections
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Figure 4: The evolution of the monetary policy stance: time-varying long-run 
coefficients on inflation, output growth, and M4 growth in the struc- 
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Figure 5: Setting to zero one shock at a time: counterfactual minus actual, 
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Figure 9: Median impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock in 
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Figure 10: Checking for the convergence of the Markov chain: inefficiency factors 
     for the draws from the ergodic distribution for the hyperparameters 
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